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Question 
What are the lessons learned from transforming revenues from natural resources into improved 
basic service delivery in resource-rich developing countries? If possible, identify key enabling 
factors from such transformation. 
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This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on how resource-rich developing countries use their resource revenues for improved 
public service delivery. Such lessons are particularly important for low-income countries that are 
in a transition phase of increased resource revenues in total revenues. The question is how they 
can build their institutions to ensure that resource revenues are used in an effective way to 
improve public service delivery and public investments. The literature is clear that 
governments in resource-rich developing countries, particularly with capital constraints, 
need to be careful not to fall into the trap to over-consume and over-invest during boom 
periods as this inevitably results in a collapse in public spending when resource prices 
are low. To assure stable budgets over a longer period, which is important for investor 
confidence in the country and to stabilise social spending, fiscal policies must challenge short-
term and middle-term pro-cyclical fiscal policies, boom-bust macroeconomic growth cycles, and 
sharp exchange rate appreciation that make non-resource exports vulnerable. 
The literature often explains why it is difficult for resource-rich developing countries to spend 
resource revenues wisely (e.g. Venables, 2016). Research shows that in general most 
resource-rich developing countries do not comply with fiscal rules, and many do not even 
have them (e.g. Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). The literature (e.g. OECD, 2018; Ossowski & 
Halland, 2016) also mentions four policy areas that need extra attention: 1) fiscal rules within a 
clear fiscal policy framework, 2) sovereign wealth funds that are embedded within the fiscal 
policy framework and a macroeconomic strategy, 3) transparent and simple to manage 
expenditure arrangements, and 4) accountable oversight bodies.  
The literature on fiscal rules further shows that having a fiscal rule on itself is not enough 
to avoid the kind of macroeconomic challenges as mentioned above; it is merely the 
specific set of fiscal rules that are more relevant as based on country-specific needs, 
institutional capacity and exposure to external shocks (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). Therefore, 
fiscal rules should be accompanied by clear fiscal procedures that ensure decisions are 
accountable at all levels. It is often assumed that embedding fiscal rules in law ensures long-term 
political commitment, although Botswana is mentioned as a country with good compliance but 
without permanent fiscal laws (African Natural Resources Center, 2016a). The advantage of 
embedding fiscal rules in law is that they become more difficult to alter when there is a change of 
governments. Legislation, particularly constitutional laws, is difficult and costly to amend. 
Overall, the literature shows that fiscal rules should not be too rigid, but flexible within 
clear margins (Mihalyi and Fernández, 2018). Capital scarce resource-rich developing countries 
should also be able to spend more money upfront, but within the confines of clear fiscal rules 
(e.g. Sharma & Strauss, 2013). However, issues related to the absorptive capacity of natural 
resource revenue-related investments in capital scarce countries must be carefully considered 
(OECD, 2018). 
Sovereign wealth funds are becoming increasingly popular tools for managing natural resource 
wealth in developing countries. Five different funds are mentioned in the literature: stabilisation 
funds, saving funds, finance funds, development funds, and strategic investment funds. Such 
resource funds can support the implementation of sound fiscal policies. Therefore, the 
establishment of a resource fund should be combined with a broader fiscal management 
framework that needs to be coherent, consistent, and disciplined (OECD, 2018). Implementing 
countries establish specific operational rules for managing their resource funds, covering 
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accumulation, withdrawal, and investment decisions. Evidence shows that sovereign wealth 
funds’ success in resource-rich developing countries depends on commitment to fiscal discipline 
and sound macroeconomic management (e.g. diversification strategy, national development 
plan) (e.g. OECD, 2018; Ossowski & Halland, 2016). For capital scarce developing countries, 
stabilisation funds must not be seen as supporting capital needs, because their 
investment policy must highlight safe foreign assets to ensure sufficient liquidity to 
counter price volatility, which can result in public criticism. In this respect, transparency is 
an important tool, not just to report on performance, but to build trust among the population that 
resource revenues are well spent (OECD, 2018).  
Saving funds have a longer time horizon inherent to the policy objective and in principle they 
afford a lower liquidity preference and a greater risk tolerance. Evidence shows that saving 
funds’ investment decision-making shielded from short-term political cycles drives better 
performance, that long-term value creation is contingent on the management of risk and 
uncertainty, and that policymakers should be aware that high-return projects in resource-
rich developing countries are not immediately available (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). 
Examples of countries that have established resource funds and successfully implemented the 
operational arrangements, at times through a process of adaptation, include Norway, Botswana 
and Chile. Countries that have been less successful in implementing resource funds include 
Chad, Nigeria, Venezuela, Ecuador and Algeria.  
Key learning points for improved management of resource funds, as mentioned in the literature, 
are an increased transparency, fiscal discipline, and capacity to manage funds. Evidence shows 
that resource-rich developing countries need to integrate the management of the funds 
within broader Public Financial Management (PFM) and Public Investment Management 
(PIM) systems and integrate the funds within the national budget to ensure clarity 
(Venables, 2016; Ossowski & Halland, 2016). Countries with weak institutional capacity and PFM 
and PIM systems should focus on one resource fund, possibly with two separate portfolios to 
meet stabilisation and savings objectives, rather than two separate funds (Sharma & Strauss, 
2013). Extra-budgetary strategic investment funds (commercial investment) are also an option, 
even though they are seldom used in low-income, resource rich countries. Strategic investment 
funds are a complementary tool that government can utilise to deploy capital within the 
economy and are most effective as part of a broader policy and institutional development 
and reform pathway (e.g. OECD, 2018). However, there are concerns over potential conflicts of 
interest between spending priorities and financial returns if these funds are not autonomous 
entities with investment decision-making made independently of direct government influence 
(Ossowski & Halland, 2016).  
Although fiscal rules and sovereign wealth funds are tools to improve fiscal stability and control 
over increasing spending (e.g. public services and public investment), an important question 
governments need to answer is how they can ensure that the spending of natural resource 
revenues improves development outcomes and is not used to cover recurrent costs (e.g. wages 
for civil servants). This is where political economy has to be considered as governments are 
under immense pressure from different stakeholders to consume more of the revenues (Fritz et 
al., 2017).  
Governments often earmark natural resource revenues for special investments (e.g. 
education or health care) to safeguard investment in these sectors. However, evidence 
from research shows that earmarking generally reduces fiscal flexibility and is open to 
capture from special interests, which can constrain budgetary flexibility (Arrellano-Yanguas & 
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Mejía Acosta, 2014; Ossowski & Halland, 2016).  Moreover, earmarking may lead to government 
inefficiency and overinvestment or underinvestment in certain public services. Earmarking can 
even contribute to procyclicality of public expenditure, which fiscal rules try to challenge (OECD, 
2018).  
There is also evidence that an earmarking ‘light’ approach, which does not rely on strict and 
complex statutory expenditure requirements and where earmarking has been linked to a clear 
long-term governmental development policy agenda approved by parliament, can be successfully 
used (e.g. Botswana) (e.g. OECD, 2018; African Natural Resources Center, 2016a). Well-
functioning stabilisation funds are important as they provide stability over a long period thus 
ensuring continued spending in downturn periods. Another option that governments could 
chose is to spend the natural resource revenues through direct distribution, via cash 
transfers. As with other socioeconomic public investments (or earmarking), funding cash 
transfer from natural resource revenues should be complemented by a fiscal framework 
that aims for stability (OECD, 2018).  
Overall, the literature shows that linking the fiscal system with PFM and PIM systems is crucial to 
help avoid the risk that resource revenues are not spent irresponsibly and without consultation 
with relevant stakeholders (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). Establishing a monitoring and 
accountability system that is independent and transparent, focusing on both complying 
with fiscal rules, advising on any changes in such rules, and evaluating the impact and 
quality of public investments, is also crucial. In cases where there is limited technical 
capacity but already one established institution working on public finance, it may be beneficial to 
build on it and expand its remit, rather than setting up a new oversight institution (Sharma & 
Strauss, 2013). Countries also increasingly make use of public consultation and building 
consensus (e.g. Timor-Leste, Ghana) for setting expectations around how the natural resource 
wealth will be managed, particularly regarding how much revenue will be available for current 
consumption and investment, and how much will be saved for future generations. 
Finally, the literature is clear that ‘best practice’ in one country is not per se the answer 
for another country, even in the same region (Mihalyi and Fernández, 2018). Four areas of 
attention have been particularly emphasised in the literature, regarding enabling factors: country-
specific needs, country-specific absorptive capacity for domestic socioeconomic investments, 
institutional capacity (consultation, decision-making, implementation, monitoring), extent of 
exposure to external shocks. All these factors create different environments to put fiscal 
frameworks (e.g. different set of fiscal rules and funds) in place that ultimately impact on the 
quality of public services delivery. For countries with low institutional capacity, high needs for 
investment, but low absorption capacity, the literature in general comes to some specific 
considerations based on evidence.  
• Any prioritisation of development-related expenditure which underwrites broad-based and 
inclusive development must be preceded by a commitment to sound and consistent 
macroeconomic management of natural resource revenues.  
• Fiscal rules can only be effective if accompanied with procedural rules. However, this 
requires robust PFM and PIM systems to be in place, which is not the case in many low-
income countries. Such countries could follow a policy guideline (instead of fully 
implementing a fiscal policy framework) to enhance fiscal discipline without 
formally committing to a specific fiscal framework until it has gone through a learning 
process and has established better PFM and PIM systems (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
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• Design and implement a fiscal framework and learn about what works through an 
iterative process. However, there is a risk that if a rule or commitment is broken the 
government could lose credibility.  
• Seek external expertise by contracting external long-term expertise or forcing a learning 
partnership with another country (e.g. Timor-Leste with Norway, or Mongolia with Chile).  
• Establish a step-by-step approach through learning to adapt existing rules and 
guidelines and introduce new next-step actions to extend the fiscal policy framework.  
• Choose a simple framework that is easily understood and straightforward to 
monitor. This approach is generally preferable to a complicated structure that is less 
transparent (Mihalyi and Fernández, 2018).  
2. Fiscal rules 
Fiscal frameworks and rules 
Governments in resource-rich developing countries have a challenge in deciding how 
much revenue is being spent and how much is saved. Fiscal frameworks are often put in 
place to guide countries’ decisions based on strict rules. Often, variants of the Permanent 
Income Hypothesis (PIH)1 have been used, but they are criticised as not workable for capital 
scarce, low-income countries. These countries need immediate (upfront) investments (in 
infrastructure and human capital) to push for further development (OECD, 2018). As a response 
two alternatives to the traditional PIH approach have been developed (Sharma & Strauss, 2013).   
• The Modified PIH allows for an initial scaling up of spending to meet immediate 
demands in poor countries, including both for consumption and public investment. 
However, fiscal policy remains anchored to an estimate of the long-term sustainable use 
of resource revenue, although spending can be front-loaded and financed through a 
drawdown from resource revenues, thereby reducing spending in future years.  
• The Fiscal Sustainability Framework aims to stabilise net resource wealth over a 
longer term than the PIH. Similar to the modified PIH, this framework takes into account 
the inter-temporal budget constraint, although it allows for an actual drawdown of 
government wealth accumulated from the natural resources. The rationale for this 
drawdown is that public spending can be stabilised at a higher level because growth-
enhancing domestic public investment will have ‘fiscal returns’ in the form of larger non-
resource revenues.  
Successful implementation of these two alternative PIH approaches depends on the quality of 
public investment and its decision-making to give a push to productivity and human capital 
growth (Ghura & Pattillo et al., 2012). Furthermore, issues related to absorptive capacity of 
 
1 The Permanent Income Hypothesis is used to guide countries’ fiscal policy frameworks and establish fiscal benchmarks. The 
PIH implies that “following a discovery of an exhaustible natural resource, consumption should increase by the expected 
annuity value of the discovery, with revenues in excess of this being invested to build a stock of assets sufficient to finance the 
consumption increment in perpetuity” (Venables, 2016). Norway for example has the approach that all additional expenditure 
should be financed by the resource revenues, which is set to be equal to the accumulating financial assets (i.e., the interest 
earned on the financial assets generated from the resources that have been extracted) (Sharma & Strauss, 2013).  
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these investments in capital scarce countries must be carefully considered (OECD, 2018). 
For clarity on what and how decisions are made, countries often establish fiscal rules. Mihalyi 
and Fernández (2018, p.3) describe fiscal rules as: 
“[A] permanent quantitative constraint on government finances. It provides a numerical 
ceiling or target for some key budget aggregate, such as the budget balance, debt, or 
spending for many years ahead. Governments use them to contain spending pressures, 
to signal a commitment to fiscal responsibility and tie the hands of politicians who may be 
tempted to overspend, including to win elections”. 
Fiscal rules have been promoted to mitigate macroeconomic risks, decrease deficits, and 
as such are believed to improve investor confidence in a country. For resource-rich 
(developing) countries fiscal rules are particularly important to help overcome three 
macroeconomic challenges associated with managing natural resource revenues (Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018):  
• Short- to medium-term pro-cyclical fiscal policy: Seeking short-term political wins can 
surge public spending of resource revenue, particularly in boom times and associated 
with high natural resource prices. However, spending needs to decrease drastically when 
revenues decline. 
• Long-run boom-bust cycles: As a result of pro-cyclical fiscal policy many resource-rich 
countries do not save or invest revenues for the benefits of future generations during 
boom periods. Government spending sprees often result in a rise in domestic wages and 
prices without substantive development outcomes. Consequently, without reserves to 
invest in downtime periods, countries can turn into long or deep spells of recession or 
depression as spending stops abruptly.   
• Exchange rate appreciation: The inflow of money can also lead to exchange rate 
appreciation, making it more difficult for domestic non-resource businesses to export or 
strive. As a result, the economy becomes even more dependent on the resource sector 
(also known as “Dutch disease”). 
The International Monetary Fund (Schaechter et al, 2012) classifies fiscal rules in four 
categories, however, in practice, governments often use some combination of these rules:2 
• Debt rules set an explicit limit or target for public debt in percent of GDP. However, 
debts are mostly affected by changes in interest or exchange rate and less by budgetary 
measures. These rules limit countries from borrowing in downtime periods but do not 
often prevent resource-rich countries’ governments from high debts in boom periods 
(Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.10). 
• Budget balance rules constrain the variable that primarily influences the debt ratio and 
are largely under the control of policy makers. However, budget balance rules are 
procyclical because they allow expenditures to increase with rising revenue, and if 
binding, they force expenditure cuts when revenues are declining. As such, these rules 
transmit the volatility of resource revenue into fiscal policy in resource-rich countries and 
do not provide flexibility in adjusting to larger commodity price drops (Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018, p.9). Some countries have non-resource current balance rules to avoid 
 
2 See for a far more detailed list of fiscal rules Ossowski & Halland (2016) p.60-62. 
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procyclical budgeting, however, these countries might create parallel budgets for current 
and capital spending (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
• Expenditure rules set limits on total, primary, or current spending. However, 
governments can circumvent rules by engaging in off budget spending and not providing 
flexibility to respond counter-cyclically to commodity price shocks. Furthermore, 
governments may try to comply with an expenditure rule by cutting productive spending 
too much compared with non-productive spending. Countries with new resource 
discoveries but limited spending capacity may consider using expenditure rules to 
surmount pressures to spend based on expectations of future wealth (Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018, p.11). 
• Revenue rules set ceilings or floors on revenues and are aimed at boosting revenue 
collection and/or preventing an excessive tax burden. Many resource-rich countries have 
set up regulations to limit how much resource revenue should enter the budget and how 
much they should deposit into a sovereign wealth fund (see section 3). However, these 
rules only constrain government finances if complemented by other rules that limit 
borrowing or debt. Otherwise, governments can save a portion of revenues, while 
borrowing at the same time and fail to achieve their objectives (Mihalyi & Fernández, 
2018, p.11).  
The literature on fiscal rules is clear that having a fiscal rule on itself is not enough to 
avoid the kind of macroeconomic challenges as mentioned above (Venables, 2016); it is 
merely the specific set of fiscal rules that is more relevant as based on country-specific 
needs, institutional capacity and exposure to external shocks (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
Also, to avoid too much ‘creative accounting’ researchers refer not only to ‘numerical fiscal rules’ 
but insist to combine them with ‘procedural fiscal rules’ that “stipulate the principles and 
associated practices of transparency and accountability that should guide the design and 
implementation of fiscal policy” (Sharma & Strauss, 2013, p.9-10). Typical procedural rules 
include: a ‘hierarchical’ budget formulation process, for example, where more power is given to 
the Ministry of Finance than to the line ministries; transparency requirements in the budget 
document; and distinct amendment rules for budget formulation and approval (Sharma & 
Strauss, 2013).  
Although several countries in sub-Saharan Africa have no (numerical) fiscal rules in 
place, in comparison with the Middle East, Northern Africa and large parts of Asia, more 
countries in the region have incorporated some of these rules, mostly following 
supranational mandates from regional institutions. However, some countries, such as Liberia, 
Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia and Uganda, also have national fiscal rules (Llédo et al., 2017).3  
Studies from Cordes et al. (2015) show that only around 60% of governments worldwide comply 
with fiscal rules and that expenditure rules have the highest level of compliance. Caselli et al. 
(2018) recognise that compliance rates are low (in high-, middle-, and low-income countries) but 
conclude that countries are more likely to follow budget balance rules when these rules are 
combined with debt or expenditure rules. Mihalyi and Fernández (2018), who analysed data from 
34 resource-rich countries (high-, middle-, and low-income countries) during the oil crash years 
of 2015-16, show that out of the 34 reviewed resource-rich countries most did not comply 
 
3 See also this map on the IMF website: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm   
8 
with their fiscal rules. No country complied with supranational fiscal rules. The following 
results come from their research (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018): 
• Compliance: Only six countries followed their fiscal rules fully in both 2015 and 2016: 
Botswana, Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia, Malaysia and Norway. Botswana, Colombia and 
Norway used a structural or a non-resource balance rule that allowed them to continue 
with some controlled (extra) spending in downturn rather than pure budget balance or 
debt targets (which often result in austerity measures). However, as the authors 
conclude, the institutional capacity, fiscal reporting and statistical quality preconditions for 
adopting structural rules are very demanding.  
• Non-compliance: 25 countries suspended, modified or disregarded the rules. Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Russia and Venezuela suspended their rules, while most just failed to 
comply. Some anticipated by modifying the rules significantly, such as Ecuador and 
Mongolia.  
• Escape clause: Only Peru invoked a well-defined escape clause, rather than modify or 
break its fiscal rule. Although many countries have an escape clause for their fiscal rules, 
only Peru has specific operational guidance on how to activate the escape clause in 
event of a natural disaster or international crisis. 
• Implementation phase: Tanzania and Uganda adopted their rules in 2015, as such they 
are only beginning to implement their fiscal rules. 
Studies that look at the impact of fiscal rules on macroeconomic stability have mixed results, in 
particular for countries with similar characteristics (Heinemann et al., 2016). Resource-rich 
countries that on paper have adopted the same kind of fiscal rules, have very different outcomes 
(see for example Table 1 in Sharma & Strauss, 2013, p.11-12). In general, resource-rich 
countries with fiscal rules show low levels of discipline to implement these rules 
effectively and comply with fiscal rules (Arezki & Ismail, 2013; Bova et al., 2016). The overall 
conclusion from research is that fiscal rules themselves do not create impact, but that the 
strength of institutions, political will to follow the rules, and some flexibility in the rules, do create 
some impact (Eyraud et al., 2018). To cite Mihalyi and Fernández (2018, p. 4): 
“Fiscal rules need robust design features that balance simplicity, flexibility and 
enforceability that supported by strong political institutions, consensus and commitment”. 
The literature also shows the importance of embedding fiscal rules in what sometimes is called a 
Fiscal Responsibility Law. Such a law is a limited-scope law that elaborates on the rules and 
procedures relating to three budget principles: accountability, transparency, and stability in the 
design and implementation of fiscal policy (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). The advantage of 
embedding fiscal rules in law is that it becomes less political during change of 
governments; legislation is difficult and costly to revert, particularly constitutional laws. 
However, this is a time-consuming political process (Sharma & Strauss, 2013) and caution needs 
to be in place on how the introduction of new laws will complement existing institutional 
traditions, particularly where ‘best practice’ procedures from other countries are being considered 
(World Bank, 2013; Eyraud et al., 2018).   
Case studies 
Botswana (source: African Natural Resources Center, 2016a) 
The framework for public spending in Botswana is based around National Development Plans 
(NDPs) that run for five to six years, and the annual budgeting process. The public finance policy 
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framework specifies that revenues derived from minerals should be used to finance investment in 
other assets. The intention is twofold: 1) to preserve the country’s overall asset base; and 2) to 
provide the basis for the generation of income that can replace mineral income when it eventually 
declines. The corollary to the asset replacement principle is that recurrent (non-investment) 
spending must be financed from recurrent (non-mineral) sources.  
Targeting this balance is more under the control of the government than the overall balance, 
allows the government to follow the same budget path irrespective of commodity revenue 
fluctuations, if the fiscal position is sustainable and financeable. The rules emphasise further that 
resource revenues and borrowing are targeted at developmental and capital spending. As such, 
it can help insulate and decouple fiscal policy from resource revenue fluctuations, at least in the 
short run, and thus contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation. Furthermore, Botswana 
complements revenue for its sovereign wealth fund Pula Fund with expenditure and debt ceiling 
rules.  
The budget balance rule has been monitored through the Sustainable Budget Index (SBI), 
defined as the ratio of non-investment spending to non-mineral revenues. In calculating the SBI, 
the normal budget classification of expenditure is adjusted so that recurrent spending on 
education and health is classified as investment in human capital. Since 1983/84 the SBI has 
been ‘sustainable’ with the exception of the period between 2001-2005 when part of recurrent 
spending was being financed by mineral revenues. Since 2006, the SBI is sustainable again as 
the share of spending on development and health and education in the budget rose sharply. 
However, the budget rules (e.g. SBI) are not embedded in jurisdiction. In other terms, the rules 
are a general statement of intent, not an ex-ante rule against which policymakers are held 
accountable. Parliament can pass any budget, whether or not it meets the SBI principle. 
Compliance with the SBI is entirely dependent upon a responsible executive (to draw up 
sustainable budgets) and a responsible legislature (to approve sustainable budgets). However, 
the country has a legislated debt rule.  
Chile (source: African Natural Resources Center, 2016b) 
Since 2001, Chile’s budget policy has been based on strong fiscal rules (e.g. structural budget 
balance rules). The structural budget balance rule seeks to link public spending to long-term 
expected government revenue by imposing a target on the structural deficit/surplus level. Hence, 
the government achieves a budget balance that is corrected for the business cycle and for 
fluctuations in copper and molybdenum prices. Between 2001 and 2007, a structural surplus 
target of 1% of GDP was established for fiscal policy, but during the financial crisis in 2008-2009 
this was reduced to 0.5% in 2008 and later reduced to a 1% deficit to stimulate the Chilean 
economy out of the recession, showing the flexibility within the rules.  
Although the Fiscal Responsibility Law (No 20,128) of 2006 did not establish a specific target for 
the structural balance, it did mandate each president to establish the bases of the fiscal policy 
during their administration and to inform Congress how its fiscal policy would affect the structural 
balance. The law outlined the savings rules for the fiscal surplus, which should be saved in a 
pension fund (minimum of 0.2% of GDP, maximum of 0.5% of GDP), in the capitalisation of the 
Central Bank (up to 0.5% of GDP during five years) and in the stabilisation fund (any surplus 
above 1% of GDP). Hence, the law provided a reference target for the desired amount of savings 
to be accumulated as liquid assets.  
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While the rules provide some flexibility to respond to shocks, it also requires strong statistical 
systems as it involves complex calculations. Although the fiscal framework has worked well, 
several changes were recommended by the Independent Committee on the Fiscal Rule in 2011 
to improve it further. For instance, the methodology used to calculate the cyclically adjusted 
balance rule no longer takes into account transitory changes in tax rates. In 2015, the 
government again changed the calculation of the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) for a more 
complex formula than it had used during the previous decade, making it more difficult to monitor 
and interpret.  
Box 1. The ways resource-rich developing countries make use of fiscal rules 
Nigeria: “Nigeria has a flat three percent deficit ceiling, which it comfortably achieved in the oil boom years. However, the 
government allowed procyclical increases in spending during the resource boom, which in turn resulted in overall balances that 
did not generate significant savings. Ultimately, the government missed the ceiling after the oil price crash.” (Source: Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018, p.9). 
Indonesia: “Indonesia complied with its budget balance rule and debt rule in both years reviewed. This follows a strong track 
record of compliance since the rules were legislated and incorporated into a coalition agreement in 2003. Indonesia’s budget is 
less dependent on oil revenues than budgets in other oil producers reviewed. The government also spent large amounts on fuel 
price subsidies, which became easier to phase out as oil prices dropped. The lessened impact of oil price drop on budget 
revenues and its beneficial impact on spending made it considerably easier for the government to comply with its overall 
balance fiscal rule in the period reviewed.” (Source: Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.15). 
Colombia: “Colombia adopted a fiscal rule in 2011 and was able to follow it in the economic downturn despite difficult 
economic times. This is because under its structural budget balance rule, Colombia had to adjust much less harshly than if it 
had an overall balance rule: both the structural oil price adjustment and the adjustment for the cyclical position of the economy 
provided additional fiscal room.” (Source: Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.14). 
Malaysia: “Malaysia has a current balance rule, also called a “golden rule,” which targets the balance of revenues and 
recurrent expenditures. This in practice means that the government only borrows for developmental or capital spending. 
According to the Malaysian Central Bank, the government complied with its public debt ceiling of 55 percent of GDP in both 
2015-2016. However, the newly elected Malaysian government recently claimed that the debt was much higher than previously 
disclosed, citing that the previous administration excluded contingent liabilities and other debts from the official figures. If these 
figures were included public debt would have reached 80% of GDP at the end of 2017. Though we assess that the numerical 
rule was complied with in 2015 and 2016, the large off-budget liabilities and irregularities relating the country’s development 
bank, Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), put into question whether the spirit of the fiscal rule was followed.” (Source: 
Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.16). 
Peru: Since 2013, Peru is one of the very few countries that uses a strict escape clause for its fiscal rules only for extreme 
situation as natural disasters or abrupt fall in international commodity prices. Most other countries that have such a clause have 
less refined guidelines to safeguard the good use of the clause. The clause allows the government to relax the deficit ceiling up 
to 2.5% of GDP. The rule includes a step-by-step description of how to return to the fiscal targets set prior to the escape clause 
and fiscal adjustments for the regional and local governments. (Source: Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, pp.19-20). 
Tanzania: Tanzania provides a good example of non-resource budget balance: the non-gas deficit limit is set at 3% of GDP, 
meaning that any gas revenue above and beyond that level needs to be saved for times of poor economic performance or until 
after gas revenues are exhausted. (Source: Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.10). 
Liberia: “The fact that Liberia complied with its fiscal rule is unsurprising given how the rule is written. Liberia adopted a debt 
ceiling in 2009, the year before obtaining almost complete debt relief. With the debt ceiling set at 60% of GDP, while the 
country’s debt shrunk to 30%, the debt rule was clearly too loose to provide any meaningful restrictions on government action. 
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However, recent forecasts suggest that the debt limit now is coming increasingly close, which will soon put the rule to a more 
challenging test.” (Source: Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.15). 
Timor-Leste: In the case of Timor-Leste, the modified PIH has been put in place with a process of adaptation. “To facilitate 
such a process, the authorities developed a peer-learning relationship with the Norwegian government. This did not mean that 
the Timor-Leste authorities adopted the institutions developed in Norway. Rather, the country was exposed to how Norway 
managed natural resource wealth, and has now adapted its own procedures in response to the local context. Whereas Norway 
adopts the PIH, the Timor-Leste authorities have followed a modified version of this fiscal framework, and thus designed the 
fiscal rule accordingly so that investment can be front-loaded to address the current development gaps. This process of 
changing and revising the fiscal rule has been accomplished through a consultative and transparent process that involved key 
agents.” (Source: Sharma & Strauss, 2013, p.7).  
3. Sovereign wealth funds 
Stabilisation, Saving, and Investment funds 
Sovereign wealth funds are becoming increasingly popular tools for managing natural 
resource wealth.4 These assets do not represent an increase in a country’s net wealth, but 
simply a shift in the composition of wealth from natural resource reserves to foreign exchange 
assets. Public sector balance sheets should reflect the current market value of these assets, 
including potential liabilities. A fund’s annual contribution to changes in the government sector’s 
net financial worth should also be recorded (Shields, 2013). 
There are five types of sovereign wealth funds (e.g. Ossowski & Halland, 2016; OECD, 2018; 
Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018):  
• Stabilisation funds are created to reduce the volatility of government revenues and 
counter the boom-bust cycles' unfavourable effect on government spending and the 
national economy.5 
• Saving funds are intended to build up savings for future generations, for example in 
special pension funds. 
• Finance funds are mainly intended to finance the budget as the fund accumulates 
budget surpluses and finances budget deficits.6 
• Development funds are created to specifically allocate resources to priority 
socioeconomic projects in the national budget.  
 
4 See for a good list of these funds worldwide Bauer et al., 2016. 
5 According to the IMF, countries that would benefit from the establishment of stabilisation funds are those that are resource 
dependent as they derive at least 20% of their revenue from natural resources and need to counter the cyclical component 
linked to the commodity cycle (OECD, 2018). 
6 Very few countries have finance funds (e.g. Norway, Chile and Timor-Leste). For some more information see Ossowski & 
Halland, 2016, p.71-73. 
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• Strategic Investment funds are revolving funds that commercially invest money in 
larger and long-term productive projects with the aim to earn money back from future 
profits.7 
Several countries combine the use of stabilisation, savings, and investment objectives in 
the design of their funds. As mentioned above (in section 2), sovereign wealth funds are not a 
fiscal rule, but such resource funds can support the implementation of sound fiscal policies 
(Baunsgaard et al., 2012). Therefore, the establishment of a resource fund is often combined 
with fiscal rules (numerical and procedural) that work within a broader fiscal management 
framework that needs to be coherent, consistent, and disciplined (OECD, 2018). Implementing 
countries establish specific operational rules for managing their resource funds, covering 
accumulation, withdrawal, and investment decisions. For example, Algeria, Iran, Libya, 
Mexico, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela have established stabilisation funds with 
price- or revenue-contingent deposit and/or withdrawal rules; Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and 
Kuwait have set up savings funds based on revenue-sharing, where a pre-determined share of 
oil or total revenues is deposited in the fund; and Norway and Timor-Leste have established 
savings funds with operational rules that are explicitly linked to the budget’s non-oil deficit 
(examples mentioned in: Sharma & Strauss, 2013).   
Having a resource fund in place does not mean budget and investment decisions are effective 
and transparent (Venables, 2016). Evidence shows that sovereign wealth funds’ success in 
resource-rich developing countries depends on commitment to fiscal discipline and 
sound macroeconomic management (e.g. diversification strategy).8 Stabilisation funds 
aimed at stabilising budget revenue within a single year have proven more resilient than those 
that cover a longer time horizon (Ossowski, 2013). Furthermore, stabilisation funds should by 
design not aim to maximise returns on investments, but rather hedge fiscal revenues against 
fluctuation of commodity prices. The OECD (2018) mention that for stabilisation funds investing 
in safe foreign assets is necessary to ensure sufficient liquidity to counter price volatility. For 
capital scarce developing countries, stabilisation funds therefore must not be seen as 
supporting capital needs, which can result in public criticism. In this respect, transparency 
is an important tool, not just to report on performance, but more importantly to build trust among 
citizens and educate the public and stakeholders on what and why conservative investment 
policies have been put in place in the first instance (OECD, 2018).  
 
7 These strategic investment funds are rare in low-income countries, with experiences to draw on from mainly form middle- and 
high-income countries like Singapore and Malaysia. Some sub-Saharan African countries, like Senegal and Nigeria, have 
established these funds more recently (OEDC, 2018). 
8 Malaysia and Chile offer examples of success to link fiscal discipline with macroeconomic strategic decisions. In Malaysia a 
strong central government implemented a series of development plans in which resource revenues (in particular oil revenues) 
were used to diversify the economy, in particular reforming agriculture. Investment programmes raised productivity and 
implemented a transition from rubber to palm oil production. In manufacturing, specific investments in infrastructure for special 
economic zones resulted in a range of labour-intensive activities including the electronics sector. Venables (2016, p.178): 
“Elements of Malaysia’s success are due to its location in a booming region and its commodity mix (rubber and tin as well as 
oil). But most importantly, the government recognized that inclusive economic growth was necessary for future stability, and 
government capacity was sufficient to implement this policy effectively”. 
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Two types of contingent mechanisms for the accumulation and withdrawal of assets are most 
frequently used (Ossowski & Halland, 2016):  
• Rules contingent on resource prices or revenues that are prespecified in advance 
(either fixed or set through a formula). Examples of current or earlier resource funds with 
these rules include Chile (copper stabilisation fund until 2006), the Russian Federation, 
Sudan, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela.  
• Rules contingent on the difference between the price (revenue) set in the budget 
for the current year—which can be specified on an ad hoc basis or by formula—and the 
actual price (revenue). Examples include Alberta (since 2004), Algeria, Bahrain, Ghana, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (until 2010), Libya, Mexico, Mongolia, Oman (since 1998), 
Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Saving funds have a longer time horizon inherent to the policy objective in principle 
affords a lower liquidity preference and a greater risk tolerance. This means that the fund 
would not be under pressure to sell assets during periods of poor market performance and it 
would be able to invest without concern for short-term liquidity. Evidence, as mentioned in OECD 
(2018), shows that investment decision-making shielded from short-term political cycles 
drives better performance, that long-term value creation is contingent on the management 
of risk and uncertainty, and that policymakers should be aware that high-return projects 
in resource-rich developing countries are not immediately available. An efficient path of 
investment needs to take into account domestic opportunities and the absorptive capacity of the 
economy (Venables, 2016). To cite Venables (2016, p.171): “There are numerous white elephant 
projects, and [low-income] resource-rich countries perform poorly on the IMF’s index of public 
investment management efficiency”.  
Examples of countries that have established resource funds and successfully 
implemented the operational arrangements, at times through a process of adaptation, 
include Norway, Botswana and Chile. In Botswana, annual capital spending has to be equal to 
the amount of diamond revenue used to finance the budget (e.g. African Natural Resources 
Center, 2016a). In Chile, the copper stabilisation fund operates on a structural balanced budget 
rule (e.g. African Natural Resources Center, 2016b). Other countries that have been mentioned 
as successful in managing the resource funds by using a fiscal framework are Timor-Leste, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon, and Trinidad and Tobago (OECD, 2018). 
Countries that have been less successful in implementing resource funds include Chad, 
Nigeria, Venezuela, Ecuador and Algeria. In Chad, the establishment of very complex 
earmarking arrangements led to separate budgets and cash management systems for oil and 
non-oil funded expenditures (e.g. Ossowski & Halland, 2016). This resulted in costly borrowing to 
finance the non-oil budget at the same time as savings were being generated in a low-yielding 
petroleum fund. In Nigeria and Venezuela, the attempt to use the long-term price of oil to guide 
savings has not been very successful due to difficulties in accurately projecting the price of oil 
(OECD, 2018). In Ecuador, an excessive earmarking scheme for the use of resource revenues 
caused liquidity problems and weakened the quality of expenditures (see also section 4). In 
Algeria, specific oil accounts were linked to multi-year investment projects through complex cash 
management systems, which undermined transparency and accountability. Gabon sometimes 
made deposits into its savings fund with low returns, while at the same time paying significantly 
higher interest rates on its high public external debt and incurring debt service arrears (Ossowski 
& Haland, 2016). 
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Key learning point from these examples, as mentioned in the literature, is the lack of 
transparency, fiscal discipline, and capacity to manage funds (Venables, 2016). In such 
cases, there is a risk that these funds can be set up as a type of parallel budget that can be 
managed under the discretion of the Executive, and are not subject to any of the basic controls 
or procedures in a sound public finance management (PFM) system (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
Therefore, evidence shows that resource-rich developing countries need to integrate the 
management of the funds within broader PFM and Public Investment Management (PIM) 
systems. As was the case for Chad and Ecuador in the early 2000s (mentioned in: OED, 2018) 
their resource funds were over-complicated to strengthen internal controls and expenditure 
tracking within a domestic PFM system that was far too weak, resulting in resource revenues 
allocated to the funds through predetermined ratios and used to fund off-budget expenditures 
(Dabán & Hélis, 2009). 
The literature, therefore, mentions the following considerations for stabilisation, saving, and 
within budget development/investment funds (e.g. Sharma & Strauss, 2013; Ossowski & Halland, 
2016; Venables, 2016; OECD, 2018): 
• Integrate the funds within the national budget to ensure clarity. Funds with their own 
mandate to invest, and with a separate legal identity, should be avoided, as this can lead 
to an excessive concentration of power, fragmentation of the budget process, and divert 
attention from ongoing PFM reform efforts. 
• The importance of transparency in the management of the resource fund has been 
demonstrated in the case of both Chile and Timor-Leste, which has enabled the 
electorate and specialised bodies to monitor if procedures are being adhered to.   
• Use controlled flexibility within the fiscal and withdrawal rules instead of rigid 
rules to control the funds. The fiscal rules and the fund’s operational rules may be 
mutually inconsistent in certain circumstances, leading to the need for difficult choices 
between compliance and avoiding inefficiency and fiscal costs. Chile’s stabilisation fund 
is an example of a fund where flexible rules have contributed to its successful 
implementation, while Venezuela had poor experiences with resource funds because of 
changes to the fund’s rules and deviations from the intended purpose.  
• Countries with weak institutional capacity and PFM and PIM systems should focus 
on one resource fund, possibly with two separate portfolios to meet stabilisation and 
savings objectives, rather than two separate funds with different objectives and asset 
management frameworks. In some cases, the limited expertise of resource funds with 
public service delivery, and limited accountability, have raised serious concerns about the 
effectiveness, prioritisation, and probity of such spending (Shields 2013). 
• Volatile resource revenue flows should not be earmarked for priority spending 
categories, as these expenditure priorities are likely to benefit from stability and 
predictability in the funding source.  
Increasingly resource-rich developing countries establish strategic investment funds as 
emerging tools for extra-budgetary investments, such as Senegal and Nigeria. Countries in 
the Middle East (e.g. Kuwait, Abu Dhabi), Russia, and countries in South East Asia (e.g. 
Malaysia, Singapore) have long experiences with such funds. They are geared toward fostering 
economic diversification by catalysing new sectors in the economy and making investments in 
infrastructure and R&D capabilities to support long-term growth and economic competitiveness 
(OECD, 2018). As strategic investment funds operate with a double bottom-line objective 
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(the aim is to generate financial returns as well as positive returns for socio-economic 
development), this can help resource-rich countries better scrutinise the financial and 
economic feasibility of development-oriented projects and avoid wasting resources on so-
called white elephant projects. As such strategic investment funds are managed like a private 
sector investment fund, based on financial returns on investment, while the public side of the 
funds should guarantee positive long-term socioeconomic outcomes.  
Strategic investment funds are a complementary tool that government can utilise to deploy 
capital within the economy. Yet, as a tool for government and given their combined financial and 
development remit, strategic investment funds are most effective as part of a broader 
policy and institutional development and reform pathway. A key challenge for strategic 
investment funds is the need at some level to coordinate across government to avoid duplication 
of public investment, while still remaining independent from political influence (OECD, 2018). 
Funds with knowledge of local markets and long-term investment horizons could be used for 
commercial or near-commercial domestic investment, including strategic investment in sectors 
that are seen as economically important and that at the same time yield commercially 
competitive risk-adjusted returns on financial investment (Clark & Monk 2015). On the other 
hand, there are concerns over the potential quality of the investments and the returns on 
investment when the fund’s owner (government) can generate conflicts of interest between 
spending priorities and financial returns (Gelb et al. 2014).  
A key difference between a strategic investment fund and a national development bank is that a 
development bank may be more likely to fund projects that produce below market returns (Gelb 
et al. 2014). Strategic investment funds are typically established with start-up capital financed by 
the state budget (or some other form of government revenue or savings). The decision to 
establish and finance such funds is thus subject both to state financing and parliamentary (or 
executive) scrutiny at the outset. However, strategic investment funds are typically 
established as autonomous entities with investment decision-making made independently 
of direct government influence (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). They are rarely accounted for in 
the state budget and can thus be classified as extra-budgetary entities. This is important because 
the fund’s vulnerability increases with political interference. In particular, funds could be used to 
bypass constraints on budget spending, and an increasing share of their portfolio could become 
inappropriate for a resource fund (Gelb et al., 2014). However, their performance and adherence 
to their intended objective(s) is still subject to periodic government review. 
Evidence shows that many strategic investment funds invest in different parts of the 
capital structure of firms (i.e. debt and equity) and large infrastructure projects. 
Investments are made in large but also small and medium-sized enterprises. Strategic 
investment funds take minority equity stakes and in some case majority equity stakes. Many 
strategic investment funds, such as the Russian Direct Investment Fund, seek to co-invest with 
external investors at home and abroad, to leverage capital investments but also to access a 
qualified and credible cadre of skills and expertise (OECD, 2018). There is not enough evidence 
from low-income countries with strategic investment funds to understand how impactful they are 
and how they are managed to achieve socioeconomic goals (see in Box 2 some information 
about Senegal and Nigeria). 
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Case studies 
Botswana (source: African Natural Resources Center, 2016a) 
Although the government accumulated financial assets during part of the mineral development 
period, this was not pursued as an active policy. Botswana has never had any rules requiring a 
specified proportion of mineral revenues to be paid into a dedicated fund; they are simply 
combined with other general revenues in the consolidated fund. Importantly, there are no rules 
regarding the payment of mineral revenues into the Government Investment Account (GIA). The 
Pula Fund, which is the national equivalent of the government savings held in the GIA. 
Botswana’s Pula Fund and GIA have been successful in managing both long-run investments 
and stabilisation.  
Similarly, there are no restrictions on withdrawals from the Pula Fund and GIA: The government 
can withdraw any amount up to its balance in the Pula Fund and GIA to fund budget deficits. 
Other than the normal public finance procedures, there are no restrictions on how much of the 
GIA can be drawn down by the government. 
This mechanism provides flexibility; for instance, during the global financial crisis of 2008/09, the 
government was able to run large deficits by drawing down in accumulated savings in the GIA, 
including the Pula Fund, and hence minimise the impact of the crisis on the economy. It has 
resulted, however, in relatively small financial asset accumulation.  
In theory, financial savings accumulated over many years of budget surpluses can be used to 
finance any level of spending and any size of budget deficit – until the savings are depleted, of 
course. There is no legal requirement for financial savings to be preserved for future generations. 
Because additions to or drawdowns from government financial savings are residual driven (i.e. 
by budget surpluses or deficits), the emphasis for sustainability is on responsible public finance 
processes and decision-making.  
Spending by Botswana’s government has been de-linked from current resource revenues, and 
revenues that do not meet government spending and investment criteria are invested abroad 
through the fund. The government has a claim on part of the Pula Fund, up to the value of the 
GIA. While there are procedures to be followed in the event of drawdowns from the Pula Fund, 
there are no legal limits on how much can be drawn down in a given time period.  
Chile (source: African Natural Resources Center, 2016b) 
From 1987-2006 Chile had the Copper Compensation Fund (FCC) to counteract the effect of 
volatile copper prices on public spending. In particular, the purpose of FCC was to save 
resources when the price of copper in a given year exceeded a long-term price and to use these 
savings when the price falls below the reference price. The FCC helped manage good and bad 
times during copper price fluctuations. In the boom years the resources accumulated in the fund 
were used to reduce debt. The operation of the FCC allowed Chile to use fiscal policy as a 
counter-cyclical tool to reduce the impact of swings in the business cycle. In 2006 it was replaced 
by the Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund (FEES). At the same time Chile established the 
Pension Reserve Fund (FRP) to help finance pension and social welfare spending. The funds 
are governed by a strong set of deposit and withdrawal rules underpinned by a structural fiscal 
rule (see in this review more in section 2) that smooths spending over time.  
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FEES allows the government to finance budget deficits and make repayments of the public debt, 
thus largely safeguarding fiscal spending against fluctuations both in the global economy as well 
as in revenues from taxes, copper and other sources. For example, in the case of a downturn 
affecting tax revenues, the national budget could be financed in part by FEES without needing to 
borrow, as was done during the 2008/9 crisis. Every year FEES receives the positive balance 
resulting from subtracting the cash contributions to the FRP and to the Central Bank of Chile 
from the fiscal surplus. This is in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law, subtracting, 
when applicable, debt repayments and anticipated contributions made during the previous year. 
Funds can be withdrawn at any time to fill budget gaps in public expenditure and to pay down 
public debt. However, withdrawals are subject to the structural balance rule. Funds can also be 
withdrawn at the discretion of the Minister of Finance to finance annual contributions to the PRF. 
FEES funds are saved in highly liquid, low-risk assets to ensure resources are available to cover 
fiscal deficits and avoid significant losses in the fund’s value. Sovereign investments are made 
exclusively in foreign government bonds from the United States, Germany and Japan because of 
their low risk. Funds are allocated according to the following strategic asset allocation: 30% in 
money market instruments, 66.5% in sovereign bonds and 3.5 % in inflation-indexed sovereign 
bonds. 
FRP and FEES are managed by the Central Bank, which outsources the management of about 
35% of the PRF to external fund managers. The Central Bank releases its own annual reports 
separate from those of the Ministry of Finance. An external auditor’s report is included in the 
report of the General Treasury. The Controller General performs an audit and reports to 
Congress and government. The Ministry of Finance also provides monthly, quarterly, and annual 
reports on the performance of the funds to Congress. 
The funds are judged to achieve high levels of transparency. Information on fund managers, 
returns on specific investments and on how deposits and withdrawals are calculated is all 
publicly available. As a result of the application of this fiscal rule during years of very high copper 
prices, Chile accumulated significant resources in its two funds. This allowed fiscal policy to 
make a contribution to reactivating the economy during the 2008/9 crisis.  
Box 2. The ways resource-rich developing countries make use of sovereign wealth funds 
Nigeria: Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account has played some role in stabilising the economy, but its effectiveness has been 
undermined by failure of many state governments to ratify the federal Fiscal Responsibility Act that set up the fund; by absence 
of sound legal foundation; and by “ad hoc disbursements”. In 2011, Nigeria established the Nigeria Sovereign Investment 
Authority (NSIA) as an independent agency to manage the country’s new sovereign wealth fund. Next to a saving and 
stabilisation fund an investment fund started, named the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund. While the savings and stabilisation 
portfolios are invested abroad, the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund takes the form of a strategic investment fund that can invest 
domestically on a commercial basis and with the aim of generating a financial return, and preferably via co-investments with 
external investors. The Fund each year develops a Five-Year Infrastructure Investment rolling plan. The current focus is on 
healthcare infrastructure, real estate, particularly mass affordable housing, motorways, and power generation. These areas 
were chosen in consultation with relevant government ministries and regulatory agencies, as well as sector experts. And, in 
some cases, a strategic partnership is formed. Importantly, including an external partner multiplies the investment and provides 
greater scrutiny and due diligence of any deal. (Source: OECD, 2018, p.33). 
Senegal: Senegal is an example of a country attempting to catalyse new economic opportunities via a strategic investment 
fund since 2012 by establishing the Fonds Souverains d’Investissements Stratégiques (FONSIS). FONSIS is modelling itself 
after Singapore’s Temasek. The goal is to consolidate and reinforce the government’s existing holdings, while making new 
investments alongside partners in the private sector to increase the productivity and dynamism of the economy. FONSIS is 
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focusing initially on investments in Senegal (e.g. solar power plants), but its founding legislation allows for investments to be 
made abroad. (Source: OECD, 2018, p.31) 
Gabon: In 2012 the existing Fonds pour les Générations Futures was renamed the Fonds Souverain de la République 
Gabonaise (FSRG), and an agency was created to identify long-term investments for the FSRG, which would be a savings fund 
with investments in Gabon. Until the fund’s capital reaches a preestablished minimum level, the fund will receive 10% of annual 
budgeted oil revenues, 50% of the difference (if any) between actual total budget revenues and the revenue projection in the 
budget, and dividends from public investments and state participation. Once the minimum capital level is reached, the FSRG 
will receive 25% of the income on its investments, and the difference between actual and budgeted oil revenues. The IMF, 
however, has projected low fiscal deficits or a broad fiscal balance over the next few years. (Source: Ossowski & Halland, 
2016, p.78). 
Cameroon: Cameroon was initially praised for setting up an offshore (and extra-budgetary) account to manage oil revenues, 
but from which about half of Cameroon’s total oil revenue subsequently disappeared. The overall record on stabilization funds 
has been poor, with multiple episodes of boom and bust (Source: Venables, 2017, p.171). 
Ghana: Ghana established funds in its Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 and deposited some revenues in saving 
and stabilisation funds. All oil and gas revenues go directly to the Petroleum Holding Fund. Part of the revenues is then 
reinvested in the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). Another share is allocated to the Ghana Petroleum Funds 
which serve the dual objective of saving for future generations (Heritage Fund) and smoothing the effects of commodity price 
volatility and sustaining public expenditure in periods of revenue shortfalls (Stabilisation Fund). The remaining share is 
channelled to the national budget through the Annual Budget Funding Amount and shall serve for spending and investment in 
priority sectors such as agriculture, education, health and infrastructure. But strong fiscal rules governing the small resource 
sector coexisted with lax budget rules elsewhere, allowing government current spending to increase dramatically, creating fiscal 
and external deficits that necessitated an IMF rescue programme early in 2015. (Source: Ossowski & Halland, 2016, p.76) 
Trinidad and Tobago: Trinidad and Tobago is one of the very few Caribbean countries with a natural-resource-revenue fund. 
The Heritage and Stabilization Fund (HSF) has well-defined objectives, a sound governance structure, and a relatively 
conservative investment portfolio. Nonetheless, inflow and outflows rules are not directly linked to fiscal indicator(s) or the 
sovereign balance sheet. Such rules need to be reassessed and more closely linked to a medium-term fiscal framework, 
improving its potential as a countercyclical tool. The fund should be considered within a sovereign asset-liability management 
framework. (Source: IMF, 2018, p.10). 
4. Managing expenditures 
Decisions on how much resource revenue should be consumed or invested and how 
much be saved or put away in a stabilisation fund, is often the outcome of political 
discussions and consultation. The literature (as mentioned earlier) agrees that capital scarce 
countries need to spend more money (but wisely) instead of focussing on savings. This does not 
mean that such countries are not in need to establish fiscal rules and sovereign wealth funds but 
find a balance that allows them to spend more upfront while still putting money aside from the 
budget for future investments (e.g. Timor-Leste). To cite OECD (2018, p.15):  
“If a country would like to spend more now, the government should be aware that the 
economy may not be able to absorb quickly and productively the increased spending and 
investment. Hence, there may be sound reasons for a developing country to save more 
of current revenues until they can be utilised more productively and sustainably”.   
Although fiscal rules and sovereign wealth funds are tools to improve fiscal stability and 
control over increasing spending, an important question governments need to answer is 
how they can ensure that the spending of natural resource revenues improves 
development outcomes. The expenditure side of the government budget in most resource-rich 
developing countries is divided into two main components, recurrent spending and development 
spending.  
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• The development budget in principle covers one-off capital items, such as roads, 
schools, other building projects, purchases of capital equipment, equity injections to 
government-owned companies, etc. The implementation of many development projects 
(and the associated expenditure) is spread over a number of years.  
• The recurrent budget mainly covers public sector salaries and wages, maintenance 
costs, consumables, debt interest etc., and relates specifically to annual expenditures.   
The annual budget includes both the annual recurrent budget provision and the annual 
component of expenditure required for on-going development projects. Resource revenues could 
find its way into the budget in very different ways. For example, domestic investment and other 
spending undertaken by resource funds only for public policy purposes are non-commercial 
activities that could be replicated through the government budget’s tax and expenditure policies. 
The public investment carried out by a fund could, under an alternative setup, be on 
budget. Social transfers from the fund also could be executed by the budget. The various 
reasons put forth for establishing this type of a fund include (Ossowski & Halland, 2016, p.80): 
• To get around weak public financial management (PFM) systems and an ineffective, 
inefficient, or corrupt budget system; and to deliver through a fund with separate 
procedures and control systems expenditure of better quality and at a lower cost (the 
“islands of excellence” argument).  
• To prevent potential overspending or rent capture by keeping resources off-budget and 
managed by a separate entity.  
• To support development by undertaking public investment projects in infrastructure or 
social infrastructure, delivering public services, or financing the private sector based on 
public policy objectives.  
Sometimes these fund activities may be motivated, at least in part, by political economy 
considerations— that is, by showing that the resource revenue is being put to good use. 
There are various ways a resource fund can spend or encumber resources for public policy 
purposes (Ossowski & Halland, 2016, p.80):  
• Spend directly off-budget.  
• Provide off-budget subsidies or domestic loans to public enterprises or the private sector, 
undertake equity investment in private domestic companies, or participate in special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) co-financed by the private sector (for example, for infrastructure 
projects) for non-commercial public policy purposes.  
• Provide guarantees to SPVs, public enterprises, or private companies, generating 
contingent liabilities. 
However, to phrase Bauer et al. (2016, p.4-5), “most governments permit domestic spending 
directly through their funds’ choices of asset holdings rather than through the budget process. 
This has undermined parliamentary accountability, democratic institutions and public financial 
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management systems in some countries”.9 In recognition of this danger some funds have 
prohibited or limited direct domestic investments (Bauer et al., 2016). 
Some countries have utilised strict earmarking practices to channel natural resource revenues to 
particular budget items often linked with national development plans (NDPs).10 However, the 
earmarking of natural resource revenues does not, in most cases, have a strong benefit 
principle (tax levied on specific activity to pay for related issues). Resource-rich developing 
countries often earmark natural resource revenues for various purposes, with the aim to protect 
spending on socio-economic development priorities and discouraging expenditure on recurrent 
budget items, while at the same time drawing public attention to these spending. However, 
evidence from research shows that “earmarking generally reduces fiscal flexibility and is 
open to capture from special interests, leading to underinvestment or overinvestment” 
(OECD, 2018, p.19). The OECD (2018) report mentions several disadvantages to earmarking: 
• It can constrain budgetary flexibility.  
• It may lead to government inefficiency, and overinvestment or underinvestment in certain 
public services.  
• It may contribute to procyclicality of public expenditure.  
• It can be fashioned such that it is not subject to parliamentary oversight. This may 
undermine public financial management and public investment.  
Ecuador in the start of the 2000s is mentioned as example how earmarking can go wrong 
(e.g. OECD, 2018; Ossowski & Halland, 2016). Although the government had in place fiscal rules 
and a stabilisation fund, on the other hand the budget process in Ecuador had been 
characterised by multiple competing interest groups, institutional instability, and limited incentives 
for long-term cooperation (Cueva & Ortiz, 2013). Most revenues were already assigned to 
specific spending targets, guaranteed subsidies and debt repayments resulting in little room for 
fiscal adjustment. The practise the stabilisation and saving funds were vehicles for earmarking oil 
revenues to different projects (Cueva & Ortiz, 2013). The complexity of the earmarking, and 
when and how deposits were made, constrained government’s ability to prioritise spending 
efficiently. As such earmarking exacerbated spending pressures during the 2003-2008 oil boom 
(Lopez-Murphy et al., 2010). In 2008 the whole fiscal system was dismantled as it became clear 
that the schemes favoured debt repayment rather than social spending (Arrellano-Yanguas & 
Mejía Acosta, 2014). 
On the other hand, Botswana and Indonesia are mentioned as countries that to some 
extent earmarked resource revenues, but without relying on strict and complex statutory 
expenditure requirements. Both countries ‘earmarking’ has been linked to a clear governmental 
development policy agenda approved by parliament. Both countries successfully combined 
 
9 In Azerbaijan, for instance, government authorities have used the State Oil Fund (SOFAZ) to directly finance strategic 
government projects such as the railway between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. These expenditure items are not subject to 
the same reporting or public procurement requirements as those financed through the normal budget process, nor are they 
subject to as much parliamentary oversight. The Angola Sovereign Fund, the National Development Fund of Iran, and Russia’s 
National Wealth Fund also bypass normal budgetary procedures and are used as vehicles for political patronage. (Source: 
Bauer et al., 2016, p.4). 
10 See for example Botwana. 
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sound macroeconomic management with clear long-term development policies, which was the 
basis for increased productive investments in human capital and infrastructure. Development 
spending was stable over a long period as the stabilisation fund ensured continued spending in 
downturn periods (OECD, 2018).   
Another option that governments could chose is to spend the natural resource revenues 
is direct distribution through cash transfers. Like with other socioeconomic public 
investments, to ensure sustainability of cash transfer expenditures from natural resource 
revenues they should be complemented by a fiscal framework that aims for stability. To cite 
OECD (2018, p.24):  
“While allocating resource revenues directly to citizens may reduce poverty and improve 
natural resource revenue accountability, there is an opportunity cost. Supporting a cash 
transfer mechanism may take away from other productivity-improving public expenditure 
and investment, such as in infrastructure, healthcare and education”.  
How much and for what purpose the government - with approval of Parliaments – spends 
resource revenues, positive outcomes depend on the government’s administrative capacity and 
abilities (on all levels). Linking the fiscal system with the public finance management (PFM) 
and public investment management (PIM) systems is crucial to help avoid the risk that 
resource revenues are not spent irresponsibly and without consultation with relevant 
stakeholders. Given the intricate link between fiscal frameworks, rules and funds, and the 
budget, as well as the need to have a robust PFM (e.g. Medium-term Expenditure frameworks)11 
and PIM system in place for the fiscal system to be effective, there is useful guidance in the 
literature on how PFM and PIM systems should be strengthened for resource-rich development 
countries.  
A centralised system of financial control and authority can help with fiscal discipline. In 
principle, a central finance ministry can balance the competing demands of spending ministries, 
regional authorities, or other lobby groups. However, to play this role effectively the finance 
ministry must have control of incoming revenues, along with sufficient political will and power to 
resist competing demands (Venables, 2016). Often the main constraint is not finance, but rather 
implementation capacity and control. Capacity can be brought in via donors (e.g. IMF). In many 
other countries control is diffuse, often with national resource companies engaging in off-budget 
quasi-fiscal activities, such as running fuel subsidy or social welfare programs.12 The hand of the 
finance ministry can be strengthened by fiscal rules.  
Key principles for considering how natural resource wealth should be integrated within 
the budget process and the wider PFM and PIM systems (consultation, decision-making, 
implementation, administrating, monitoring) that Sharma and Strauss (2013) mention, are: 
• The budget should have a transparent presentation of resource revenue; 
• If a natural resource fund is established, it should be fully integrated in the national 
budget process;  
 
11 See more on this in Ossowski & Halland, 2016, Chapter 6. 
12 An extreme example mentioned by Venables (2016) is Venezuela. 
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• Whether a natural resource fund is established or not, resource revenue should not be 
earmarked for specific expenditure items. Instead, resource revenue should be handled 
as part of a unified budget preparation and execution process.  
• To enhance oversight and transparency, a special unit should be established at the 
Ministry of Finance to reconcile and disseminate resource revenue information. 
As highlighted earlier (in section 3) extra-budgetary investments can also be used to 
increase strategic investments, in particular within businesses, specific economic sectors 
and infrastructure. Although most of these investments need a financial return, if well linked 
with NDPs and other macroeconomic strategies for diversification these funds (if well managed 
and equipped) are able to supplement existing public spending to boost socioeconomic 
outcomes. 
5. Transparency and independent monitoring 
One of the main points mentioned in the literature to achieve a fiscal stability and predictable 
inflows of resource revenues to public investments within the context of resource-rich developing 
countries, is to establish a monitoring and accountability system that is independent and 
transparent focusing on both complying to fiscal rules, advising on any changes in such 
rules, and evaluating impact and quality of public investments.  
In the study of Mihalyi and Fernández (2018) only one third of the 34 reviewed resource-rich 
countries have established an external oversight body tasked with monitoring compliance with 
their fiscal rules. These are either supreme audit institution, fiscal advisory councils or 
parliamentary budget offices. The aims, mandates and limitations of these institutions vary 
depending on the legal, political and institutional environment of each country.  
• Supreme audit institutions increasingly play a role in overseeing the fiscal framework, 
but only when fiscal rules are widely adopted (e.g. Brazil, India, Indonesia). They can 
play an important role in resource governance as they oversee compliance with rules 
across the whole extractive decision chain. They are well placed to monitor whether the 
law was followed and if budgetary and fiscal targets have been met. However, audits are 
protracted in time, often completed more than a year after budget execution, which 
hinders their ability to warn about impending risks (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018).13 
• Many fiscal councils were established after the global economic crisis in 2008. Unlike 
audit institutions, fiscal councils generally conduct ex-ante evaluations of compliance with 
the rule through forecasts and provide inputs into the planning and policy formulation 
process (e.g., by estimating costs of measures), often making explicit recommendations 
on fiscal sustainability. Unfortunately, the technical expertise needed for a well-
 
13 The Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), conducts inspections and audits on its own 
initiatives or by request of the National Congress. The house of representatives elects the audit board of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK). The BPK provides periodic reports on state finance accountability, including 
periodic reports on fiscal compliance. It is established in the constitution and is independent from both the legislative and 
executive branches of government. In India, however, the president elects the comptroller and auditor-general members. The 
Indian audit institution’s mandate is vague in respect of fiscal rules oversight, but it does report on compliance regularly (Mihalyi 
& Fernández, 2018). 
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functioning fiscal council remains a challenge across low-income countries (Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018). 
• A parliamentary budget office’s role is to provide technical support to parliamentarians 
in their legislative and oversight functions. They often do this by supporting the work of 
the main budget committees, or evaluating or costing various new bills. Some also review 
compliance with fiscal rules.14 
In the cases where there is limited technical capacity but already one established 
institution working on public finance, it may be beneficial to build on it and expand its 
remit, rather than setting up a new institution (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). Most common in 
developing countries is to establish a fiscal advisory council. For example, in Timor-Leste, 
Nigeria, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Indonesia and Ghana independent fiscal advisory councils have 
been created to advise (non-binding recommendations) governments and legislators in the 
management of their resource wealth and related fiscal policy formulation and implementation.15 
To cite Sharma and Strauss (2013, p.15): “Opening up fiscal policy to scrutiny by an independent 
body is a good practice of fiscal transparency, which puts pressure on the government to be 
honest. Enshrining independence in legislation is considered an effective means of 
demonstrating political support for a fiscal council”.  
Typically, fiscal councils are government or legislative agencies mandated to provide 
independent advice on and/or verify fiscal policies, plans and performance (Hemming, 
2013; Hemming & Joyce, 2013). Many fiscal councils must, as part of their mandates, check 
compliance with fiscal rules, although they cannot prevent governments from actually breaking 
these rules. However, the literature also mentions that too much pressure from fiscal councils on 
governments could undermine the credibility of the government and draining scarce resources 
from the government (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). While the mandate of fiscal councils differs 
among countries, no council has been granted the power to set fiscal targets or change taxes, as 
this would raise serious issues of democratic accountability (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). 
Empirical evidence on the usefulness of fiscal councils in developing countries is still sparse 
(Hemming, 2013). However, Mihalyi and Fernández (2018) research shows overall countries 
 
14 The Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Publicas (CEFP) in Mexico is an examples of parliamentary budget offices. It is not 
legally mandated to monitor compliance with the fiscal rules. Nevertheless, CEFP started publishing quarterly public finance 
reports in 2016, which can be used to monitor the rules.  
15 For example, Timor-Leste has established a Petroleum Fund Advisory Council that advises Parliament, an Investment 
Advisory Board that advises the Minister of Finance, and appoints an external auditor by law. The external auditor is appointed 
by the Government and the auditor’s report is included in the annual report of the Petroleum Fund, which is available to 
Parliament and the public (Petroleum Fund Law, Art. 34). The Law requires the external auditor to be an internationally 
recognised firm appointed on a term contract (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). In Ghana the citizen-based PIAC monitors and 
evaluates the Government’s management of the Ghana Petroleum Fund, facilitates public debate, and provides an 
independent assessment about the use and management of the petroleum revenues, in particular to ensure that petroleum 
revenues are used for the benefit of both current and future generations. Ghana also has an Investment Advisory Committee, 
comprising seven members, advising the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning on the investment policy and monitor the 
performance of the fund. The Minister shall not make any decisions in relation to the investment strategy or management of the 
Funds without first seeking advice from the Investment Advisory Committee and the Governor of the Bank of Ghana. 
Independent audits are part of the framework, but there is no jurisdiction (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). - See more examples in 
Ossowski & Halland, 2016, p.66. 
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with national independent oversight bodies are more likely to follow fiscal rules than 
countries with no formal oversight. Colombia, Indonesia and Peru are all examples of 
countries with strong oversight bodies publishing yearly reports on fiscal rule compliance.16 But 
fiscal councils require capacity and strong governance structures, which may be difficult to 
establish, especially in low-income resource exporters (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). 
Still, most resource-rich developing countries have no oversight bodies at all in place 
(e.g. Liberia) or they are purely internal government oversight bodies in place to monitor 
progress and compliance (e.g. Malaysia, Argentina).17 However, in other cases, the degree of 
independence is more difficult to evaluate. As Mihalyi and Fernández (2018) mention, in Chile, 
the fiscal advisory council is comprised of five renowned fiscal experts all appointed by the 
government, but it has no staff or budget. Furthermore, the Fiscal Council in Chile is not formally 
accountable to Congress. Greater autonomy would allow the council to provide a more objective 
and credible assessment of fiscal policy and government compliance with the fiscal rule (African 
Natural Resources Center, 2016b). Also, Botswana, praised for its fiscal framework and 
discipline combined with macroeconomic development goals, is not a good example on 
transparency and independent monitoring. Although ‘reasonably detailed data’ are published on 
government revenues and spending, no information is published on the disbursement of funds to 
service delivery units (African Natural Resources Center, 2016a).  
Commitments of governments to increase transparency is important. A number of 
resources and initiatives are available to enhance transparency efforts, such as the Global 
Initiative for Fiscal Transparency; the Open Budget Initiative; and the IMF’s Guide on Resource 
Revenue Transparency, Code of Good Practice on Fiscal Transparency, and Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes. Resource-rich developing countries are encouraged to join 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims to strengthen governance by 
improving transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, and thereby limit the rentier 
state culture.18 This initiative, which is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society 
groups, investors and international organisations, was established in 2002.  
Countries increasingly make use of public consultation and building consensus (e.g. 
Timor-Leste, Ghana) for setting expectations around how the natural resource wealth will 
be managed, particularly regarding how much revenue will be available for current 
consumption and investment, and how much will be saved for future generations. This is 
particularly important for countries that are in a transition to increase natural resource revenues 
significantly. This would entail ensuring participation and consultation in the optimal fiscal policy 
framework, and then identifying the mechanisms required to achieve this. Fiscal frameworks can 
 
16 Norway does not have an oversight body for its rule, but the government did task a public expert commission to review 
compliance with the rule. Malaysia has no independent oversight, though it has an internal government body. Botswana and 
Liberia on the other hand have followed their fiscal rules despite not having formal oversight bodies (Mihalyi & Fernández, 
2018).  
17 Supranational bodies generally oversee supranational rules. There is a regional commission tasked with monitoring the rules 
with legal independence from member states. Given the low compliance with supranational rules, Mihalyi and Fernández 
(2018) state that it may be beneficial to delegate some oversight tasks to national entities.  
18 Botswana has not subscribed to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and does not meet the EITI Standard 
(EITI, 2015). 
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be implemented as part of the process. The implication is that transparency is important, so that 
revenue flows and spending are visible to parliament and civil society.  
6. Enabling factors 
The literature is very clear that ‘best practice’ in one country is not per se the answer for 
another country, even in the same region. Differences in political economy, for example, 
is one important issue that influences decision-making and outcomes (Fritz et al., 2017). 
Being clear about different institutional arrangements and roles is essential for assessing 
bottlenecks and likely difficulties, as well as for identifying priorities for engagement on 
institutional changes. Four areas of attention have been particularly emphasised in the literature, 
regarding enabling factors:  
• Country-specific needs,  
• Country-specific absorption capacity for domestic socioeconomic investments,  
• Institutional capacity (consultation, decision-making, implementation, monitoring),  
• Extent of exposure to external shocks. 
All these factors create different enabling environments for fiscal frameworks (e.g. 
different set of fiscal rules and funds) that impact on the quality of public services 
delivery (e.g. Sharma & Strauss, 2013). For countries with low institutional capacity, high needs 
for investment, but low absorption capacity, the literature in general comes to some specific 
considerations based on evidence. For example, any prioritisation of development-related 
expenditure which underwrites broad-based and inclusive development must be preceded by a 
commitment to sound and consistent macroeconomic management of natural resource revenues 
(OECD, 2018). Linking the fiscal framework with macroeconomic framework therefore is required 
to ensure better-quality and productive public spending. 
Another consideration from the literature is that numerical fiscal rules can only be effective if 
accompanied with procedural rules. However, this requires robust PFM and PIM systems 
to be in place, which is not the case in many low-income countries. Such countries could 
follow a policy guideline (instead of fully implementing a fiscal policy framework) to enhance 
fiscal discipline without formally committing to a specific fiscal framework until it has gone 
through a learning process and have established better PFM and PIM systems (Corbacho & Ter-
Minassian, 2013). In this case, the country will still need to choose the overall fiscal policy 
framework, and what the appropriate policy guideline or rule is for achieving this (Sharma & 
Strauss, 2013).  
To cite Sharma and Strauss (2013, p.17):  
“A potential risk to this approach is that if the authorities do not commit to a formal [fiscal 
arrangement], such as a resource fund or a procedural rule, the basis for monitoring 
compliance to fiscal discipline is not as strong and it may become difficult for citizens to 
demand accountability. Therefore, the importance of public participation and consultation 
in designing the fiscal guidelines will still be an important factor”.   
Another option mentioned by Sharma and Strauss (2013) is to design and implement a 
fiscal framework and learn about what works through an iterative process. However, as the 
authors mention, there is a risk that if a rule or commitment is broken the government could lose 
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credibility. This could be particularly pertinent in post-conflict countries where governments need 
to establish trust with citizens.  
There are several ways the literature mentioned how resource-rich developing countries 
can access capacity. For example, contracting external long-term expertise or forcing a learning 
partnership with another country (e.g. Timor-Leste with Norway, or Mongolia with Chile). Most 
important is that countries establish a step-by-step approach through learning to adapt existing 
rules and guidelines and introduce new next-step actions to extend the fiscal policy framework. 
For example, countries do not need to start directly with a sovereign wealth fund to be effective, 
but if they want, they need to have fiscal rules in place and comply with them, including 
independent monitoring. Therefore, choosing a simple framework that is easily understood 
and straightforward to monitor is generally preferable to a complicated structure that is 
thereby less transparent (Dabán & Hélis, 2010).  
Only after a fiscal policy framework is in place, linked with PFM and PIM systems, and 
macroeconomic frameworks, governments can consider strategic investment funds that can 
further help natural resource rich countries manage long-term financing challenges and shrinking 
fiscal space, while balancing policy and commercial objectives. Such funds are most effective 
as part of a clear government investment policy that establishes the priorities, criteria and 
targets for investment, coupled with some level of coordination across government levels 
and different agencies to avoid duplication of public investment (OECD, 2018). 
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